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MOORE V. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO.
United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit, 21 September 1990.
912F.2d 789
A time charterer is not responsible for injuries sustained by a debarking passenger despite actual or constructive knowledge that a haz
ardous condition exists.
court further found that since no express agreement was created to fur
ther extend the traditional sphere of control and responsibility of a
time charterer, it could only hold ODECO liable under §5(b) if the
duty breached lay within the traditional control of a time charterer.

FACTS: Appellant Mack J. Moore (Moore) was a production worker
employed by ODECO Oil and Gas Co. (ODECO). ODECO and
Phillips Petroleum Co. (Phillips) owned an unmanned fixed platform
located on the Outer Continental Shelf off the coast of Louisiana.
ODECO entered into a time charter agreement for the vessel M/V C

The court noted that a time charterer is responsible for the routes it

DICTATOR (DICTATOR) with the vessel owner, Co-Mar Offshore

chooses to follow, the cargo it chooses to store and its destination,

Marine Co. (Co-Mar). Moore was transported aboard the Dictator to
the fixed platform. To reach the platform, Moore swung from a rope

while the vessel owner remains liable for the ship's seaworthiness, the
crew's negligence and the safety of its embarkation/debarkation sys

attached to a beam extending from the top deck of the platform. The

tem for passengers. Therefore, the court found that either Co-Mar, as

rope broke and Moore suffered a shoulder injury. This method of

vessel owner, or ODECO, as the employer, were responsible for

debarkation is normally used.

Moore's unsafe debarkation. The court stated that ODECO, as
employer, controlled the physical condition of the rope and could be

ODECO, as Moore's employer, paid Moore worker's compensa

charged with knowledge of its impairment. The court further found

tion. Moore then sued ODECO under the Longshore and Harbor

that ODECO is liable under worker's compensation, which it was

Workers' Compensation Act, 35 U.S.C. § 905(b) (LHWCA), alleging
that ODECO as time charterer knew that the rope was rotten, thereby
breaching the duty of due care owed to him as a passenger.

already paying to the appellant. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit
found Co-Mar to be responsible for the safe debarkation of passen
gers. The court found that in either event, the responsibility for safe

ISSUE: Is a time charterer liable to a passenger under the LHWCA

debarkation is not a traditional responsibility of a time charterer under

when the debarking passenger is injured due to a hazardous condition

5(b) and that no cause had been shown to warrant an extension of the
traditional duties as noted.

of which the time charterer has actual or constructive knowledge?

Judy L. Berberian '91

ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established
that the LHWCA is applicable because the platform in question lies on
the Outer Continental Shelf. The court stated that under §5(b) a cov
ered person who is caused injury by the negligence of a vessel may
bring an action against the vessel as a third party. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
The court had previously held that an injured worker has standing to
sue the time charterer when the time charterer is also his employer.
The court went on to state that appellant must first establish that a
duty of due care was owed to him by ODECO acting as the time char
terer, because as an employer, ODECO is only obligated to pay an
employee worker's compensation when that employee is injured. The

S ISSON V. RUBY
United States Supreme Court, June 25, 1990
110 S. CT. 2892 (1990 WL 84059)
A fire on board a pleasure yacht docked at a marina, on "navigable waters," which causes damage to neighboring pleasure craft and the
marina, is a "potential hazard to maritime commerce arising out of an activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional mar
itime activity" and therefore, admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1331(1).
ISSUES: 1) Whether a limitation of liability suit brought in connec
tion with a fire on board a pleasure yacht docked at a marina on navi

FACTS: Everett Sisson owned the Ultorian, a 56 foot pleasure yacht.
On September 24, 1985, while the Ultorian was docked at a marina on
Lake Michigan, a navigable waterway, a fire erupted in the vessel's

gable waters falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal

washer/dryer unit. The fire destroyed the Ultorian and damaged sever
al neighboring vessels and the marina. The owners of the neighboring

independently confers admiralty jurisdiction over the suit.

courts. 2) Whether the Limitation of Liability Act 46 U.S.C.

vessels and the marina filed claims against Sisson for over $275,000

183(a)

ANALYSIS: The United States Supreme Court held that a fire on

in damages. Invoking the Limitation of Liability Act 46 U.S.C.

board a pleasure vessel docked at a marina, on navigable waters,
which causes damage to neighboring pleasure vessels and the marina,

§183(a), Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in
federal district court to limit his liability to $800, the salvage value of

was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district court. Prior
to the decision of this case, admiralty jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C.

the Ultorian after the fire. Sisson argued that the federal court had
maritime jurisdiction over his limitation of liability action under 28
U.S.C. §1331(1). The district court disagreed, and dismissed the peti
tion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Sisson sought reconsidera

§ 1331(1), was proper if the incident at issue: 1) occurred on navigable
waters and 2) bore a significant relation to traditional maritime activi
ties. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266
(1972). In deciding the case at bar, the Supreme Court expanded upon

tion on the ground that the Limitation of Liability Act independently
conferred jurisdiction over the action.

§

The district court denied

the two part test in order to clarify the scope of admiralty jurisdiction.

Sisson's motion. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

The Court began its opinion by reviewing the development of the

affirmed, holding that neither 1331(1) nor the Limitation of Liability

jurisdictional test. Prior to the decision in Executive Jet, admiralty
jurisdiction was determined largely by the application of the "locali-

Act conferred jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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